BRICS+ Series: The Bab el-Mandeb Is Back in the War

The renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and Red Sea shipping are raising a much bigger question for the global economy. One of how far will the conflict spread into one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints as talks continue to stall?

This answer matters because the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is not simply another stretch of water. It connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, forming the southern gateway to the Suez Canal. Any sustained disruption there can force ships travelling between Asia and Europe to take a much longer route around Africa, adding days to journeys and significant costs to global supply chains.

That risk is becoming increasingly tangible, as Houthi attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and renewed threats against shipping have already pushed maritime traffic lower. Today, the 11 of August, a cargo vessel was attacked in the Bab el-Mandeb, with three crew members reportedly killed, demonstrating that the threat to commercial shipping is once again moving beyond rhetoric and into direct attacks on vessels.

The Houthis have not formally claimed responsibility for every recent maritime incident, but the wider pattern is clear. The group has resumed attacks on Saudi-linked targets after a period of relative calm following the 2022 ceasefire, while also threatening vessels connected to its regional adversaries.

Why the Bab el-Mandeb Matters

The strategic importance of the strait comes from its connection to the Suez Canal, one of the world’s most important trade routes. Before the recent Red Sea disruptions, roughly 12% to 15% of global trade moved through the Suez Canal, while the route also carried significant volumes of oil and liquefied natural gas.

When the Red Sea became dangerous during the previous Houthi campaign, major shipping companies began diverting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. The alternative route adds thousands of nautical miles between Asia and Europe, increasing fuel consumption, crew costs, insurance premiums and transit times.

The disruption quickly moved beyond shipping companies. Longer journeys reduced the effective capacity of the global container fleet because more ships were required to maintain existing schedules. Freight rates increased, delivery times stretched and businesses faced higher costs for everything from manufactured goods to industrial components.

That experience provides a useful indication of what could happen if the current escalation becomes sustained.

The important point is that the Houthis do not necessarily need to physically close the Bab el-Mandeb to achieve a significant economic effect. If attacks become frequent enough, shipping companies and insurers can make the decision to avoid the route altogether. That is precisely what makes the current situation so difficult to contain.

How Likely Is a Full Closure?

A complete closure of the Bab el-Mandeb is possible, but it is not currently the most likely scenario.

The more probable outcome is continued selective attacks and a gradual reduction in commercial traffic as shipowners reassess the risks. The United States has warned commercial vessels operating around the southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden that they face threats including drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, explosive boats and attempted boarding.

The latest fatal attack is likely to reinforce those concerns. For international shipping, the calculation is ultimately commercial as much as military. If the cost of taking the shorter route becomes greater than the additional cost of sailing around Africa, companies will choose the longer route.

The Houthis therefore have an asymmetric advantage. They can impose enormous economic costs without possessing the naval capabilities required to completely control the waterway.

There is also a wider escalation risk. Analysts cited by AGBI argue that the Houthis appear increasingly focused on damaging Saudi Arabia’s economic infrastructure, including oil facilities, ports, airports and transportation networks. Continued attacks could eventually force Riyadh into a more direct military response, creating another cycle of retaliation.

If Saudi Arabia responds more aggressively and the Houthis retaliate against shipping, the conflict could become increasingly difficult to separate from international commerce.

A Global Economic Problem

The consequences would extend well beyond Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Europe and Asia rely heavily on the Suez route for trade, while energy markets remain particularly sensitive to disruptions around strategic maritime chokepoints. A sustained reduction in Red Sea shipping could once again push up freight and insurance costs and add pressure to already complicated global supply chains.

The situation becomes even more concerning if instability affects multiple chokepoints simultaneously. The global economy is already watching developments around the Strait of Hormuz, another critical passage for international energy supplies. Serious disruption at both routes would create a much larger shock to global trade and energy markets.

For now, however, the most likely scenario is not a permanent blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb. It is a period of heightened insecurity in which shipping companies increasingly avoid the Red Sea, particularly vessels perceived to have links to Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United States or their allies.

But that distinction may offer little comfort to the global economy. The previous Houthi campaign demonstrated that shipping does not have to stop completely for a maritime conflict to have global consequences. It only has to become sufficiently dangerous for companies to choose another route.

The Bab el-Mandeb has therefore already been drawn back into the conflict. The question now is whether the renewed attacks remain contained or develop into a sustained campaign that once again forces global shipping to turn south, around Africa.

If that happens, the consequences will not be confined to the Red Sea. They will be felt in freight rates, energy markets, supply chains and ultimately the prices paid by consumers thousands of kilometres away from Yemen.

Written by: 

*Dr Iqbal Survé

Past chairman of the BRICS Business Council and co-chairman of the BRICS Media Forum and the BRNN

*Chloe Maluleke

Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group

Russia & Middle East Specialist

**The Views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of Independent Media or IOL.

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