Helium is not a commodity that most people think about. It is the second lightest element in the universe, and completely irreplaceable in the processes that make modern technology possible. In semiconductor fabrication facilities, helium does two things that nothing else can do. It cools silicon wafers during plasma etching with a precision that no alternative gas can match, and it enables photolithography, the process of printing a chip’s circuitry at the nanometre scale. Advanced memory chip fabrication, including the development of 2-nanometer and 3-nanometer chips, requires massive and uninterrupted flows of ultra-high-purity helium to manage the intense thermal density of the process.
There is no substitute. Unlike rare earth elements, where investment can theoretically shift supply chains over time, helium is a finite byproduct of natural gas processing. You cannot mine more of it on demand, synthesise it and worse, you cannot stockpile it. Helium leaks out at between 0.1% and 1% per month, depending on the quality of the gaskets, The moment supply is cut, the clock starts.
The Geography of Fragility
Following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps declared the Strait of Hormuz closed. Transits through the strait collapsed from an average of 103 vessels in the final week of February to single digits within weeks, effectively bringing flows to a near standstill.
The strait is 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. Through it flows roughly a fifth of the world’s oil, a fifth of its liquefied natural gas, a third of its fertiliser trade and approximately a third of the world’s commercial helium.
Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest LNG export facility, produces helium as a byproduct of gas processing. Operations were halted after it was struck by an Iranian drone early in the war. When the Strait of Hormuz closes, once the LNG storage tanks fill, those plants have to shut down entirely.
The suspension of Qatari liquefaction facilities, combined with the physical closure of the strait, has abruptly removed more than a third of global helium supply from the market, and the market had almost no room to absorb it. Global helium demand reached 177.3 million cubic meters in 2025, while total production capacity stood at approximately 175 million cubic meters annually indicating that this is a market operating with essentially zero buffer.
The Manufacturing Exposure Is Not Evenly Distributed
Korean manufacturing facilities relied on Qatar to supply 64.7% of their total helium imports in 2025, according to the Korea International Trade Association. South Korea is not a peripheral player in this industry. Samsung and SK Hynix together produce roughly two-thirds of the world’s memory chips, the DRAM that sits inside every data centre, every AI server and every consumer device on the planet. Taiwan bought 69% of its helium from Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2024. Between these two countries, you are looking at the overwhelming majority of the world’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing capacity now dependent on severed supply.
Ray Wang, computer memory analyst at SemiAnalysis, has been direct about the longer-term risk. A prolonged regional conflict could potentially disrupt chipmakers’ manufacturing operations regarding sourcing of materials like helium and bromine.
Spot helium prices have already surged between 40% and 100% since the war began. South Korean chip manufacturers have stockpiled enough helium to last around six months, and large manufacturers are insulated in the near term by long-term contracts. But as helium consultant Phil Kornbluth has noted, even those buyers at the front of the allocation line will see price hikes, and everybody is going to feel the disruption to some degree during the transition period.
There is also a physical problem compounding the supply crunch. Suppliers move the world’s helium in roughly 2,000 expensive cryogenic containers, many of which are now stuck in Qatar or on cargo ships mid-journey. Around the six-week mark, the product in those containers begins to evaporate. The gas is not sitting in a warehouse waiting to be released. It is degrading on the water.
The Ceasefire: Relief, or Just Delay?
On 7 April 2026, Trump agreed to suspend attacks on Iran for two weeks, contingent on Iran agreeing to a complete, immediate, and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed acceptance, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stating that safe passage through the strait would be possible for the two-week period, coordinated through Iran’s armed forces. The ceasefire was brokered by Pakistan.
Markets responded immediately. International oil prices fell 13% on the news, and S&P 500 futures indicated the index could open more than 2% higher. But for the manufacturing systems described,this article, the ceasefire changes less than the headlines suggest.
Two weeks of open passage is not the same as supply normalisation. Kornbluth has been clear on this: even if the strait opened tomorrow, the supply disruption would last at least two additional months, as suppliers work through force majeure declarations and repositioning of containers. The cryogenic tanks that evaporated at sea cannot be refilled in a fortnight. The helium plants at Ras Laffan that were struck by Iranian drones cannot be restarted with a ceasefire announcement. Damage assessments suggest that approximately 14% of Qatar’s helium export capacity, equivalent to about 4-5% of global supply could be offline for years.
None of this means the ceasefire is meaningless. It reduces the immediate risk of further escalation, it begins to clear the physical backlog in the strait, and it creates the conditions under which a longer agreement might be reached. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council has hinted the ceasefire could be extended beyond its initial two weeks if negotiations in Islamabad proceed favourably. That matters enormously for the medium-term trajectory of semiconductor supply.
The deeper structural problem though, the one this war has exposed rather than created, does not resolve with a ceasefire. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed a deep structural vulnerability in the global semiconductor industry. Geoeconomic confrontation is now a key driver of economic and industrial policy, as the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 notes. A two-week pause is not a supply chain strategy. The strait was always a vulnerability. What changed is that the world can no longer pretend otherwise.
Written by:
*Chloe Maluleke
Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group
Russia & Middle East Specialist
**The Views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of Independent Media or IOL.
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